Subset models for justification logic by Lehmann, Eveline & Studer, Thomas
Subset models for justification logic?
Eveline Lehmann and Thomas Studer
Institute of Computer Science, University of Bern, Switzerland
{lehmann,tstuder}@inf.unibe.ch
Abstract. We introduce a new semantics for justification logic based
on subset relations. Instead of using the established and more symbolic
interpretation of justifications, we model justifications as sets of possible
worlds. We introduce a new justification logic that is sound and complete
with respect to our semantics. Moreover, we present another variant of
our semantics that corresponds to traditional justification logic.
These types of models offer us a versatile tool to work with justifications,
e.g. by extending them with a probability measure to capture uncertain
justifications. Following this strategy we will show that they subsume
Artemov’s approach to aggregating probabilistic evidence.
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1 Introduction
Justification logic is a variant of modal logic that includes terms representing
explicit evidence. A formula of the form t : A means that t justifies A (or t
represents evidence for A, or t is a proof of A). Justification logic has been
introduced by Artemov [3,4] to give a classical provability interpretation to S4.
Later it turned out that this approach is not only useful in proof theory [4,15]
but also in epistemic logic [5,6,11,12]. For a general overview on justification
logic, we refer to [8,2,16].
There are various kinds of semantics available for justification logic. Most
of them interpret justification terms in a symbolic way. In provability interpre-
tations [4,15], terms represent (codes of) proofs in formal system like Peano
arithmetic. In Mkrtychev models [18], which are used to obtain decidability,
terms are represented as sets of formulas. In Fitting models [13], the evidence
relation maps pairs of terms and possible worlds to sets of formulas. In modular
models [7,14], the logical type a justification is a set of formulas, too. Notable
exceptions are [1,9] where terms are interpreted as sets of possible worlds. How-
ever, these papers do not consider the usual term structure of justification logics.
Also note that there are topological approaches to evidence available [10,21,22],
which, however, do not feature justifications explicitly in their language.
? This work was supported by the Swiss National Science Foundation grant
200021 165549.
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2 E. Lehmann, T. Studer
It is the aim of this paper to provide a new semantics, called subset semantics
for justification logic that interprets terms as sets of possible worlds and oper-
ations on terms as operations on sets of possible worlds. We will then say that
t : A is true if A is true in all worlds belonging to the interpretation of t. We give
a systematic study of this new semantics including soundness and completeness
results and we show that the approach of [1] can be seen as a special case of our
semantics.
Usually, justification logic includes an application operator that represents
modus ponens (MP) on the level of terms. We provide two approaches to handle
this operator in our semantics. The first is to include a new constant c?, which
is interpreted as the set of all worlds closed under (MP) and then use this new
constant to define an application operator. Unlike in traditional justification
logic, this application operator will be commutative. The second way is to include
a (non-commutative) application operator directly. However, this leads to some
quite cumbersome definitions.
Another difference between our semantics and many other semantics for jus-
tification logic is that we allow non-normal (impossible) worlds. They are usually
needed to model the fact that agents are not omniscient and that they do not see
all consequences of the facts they are already aware of. In an impossible world
both A and ¬A may be true or none of them. This way of using impossible
worlds was investigated by Veikko Rantala [19,20].
We start with presenting the c?-subset models with the corresponding syntax,
axioms and semantics and proving soundness and completeness. In a second part
we will present the alternative approach, i.e. keeping the (j)-axiom and dealing
with some cumbersome definitions within the semantics. It will be shown that
the corresponding models are sound and complete as well. In a last section we
will show that c?-subset models can be used to reason about uncertain knowledge
by referring to Artemov’s work on aggregating probabilistic evidence.
2 L?CS-subset models
2.1 Syntax
Justification terms are built from countably many constants ci and variables xi
and the special and unique constant c? according to the following grammar:
t ::= ci | xi | c? | (t+ t) | !t
The set of terms is denoted by Tm. The operation + is left-associative.
Formulas are built from countably many atomic propositions pi and the sym-
bol ⊥ according to the following grammar:
F ::= pi | ⊥ | F → F | t : F
The set of atomic propositions is denoted by Prop and the set of all formulas is
denoted by LJ . The other classical Boolean connectives ¬,>,∧,∨,↔ are defined
as usual.
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We investigate a family of justification logics that differ in their axioms and
how the axioms are justified. We have two sets of axioms, the first axioms are:
cl all axioms of classical propositional logic;
j+ s : A ∨ t : A→ (s+ t) : A;
jc? c? : A ∧ c? : (A→ B)→ c? : B.
The set of these axioms is denoted by L?α.
There is another set of axioms:
j4 t : A→!t : (t : A);
jd t :⊥→⊥;
jt t : A→ A.
This set is denoted by L?β . It is easy to see that jd is a special case of jt. By L
?
we denote all logics that are composed from the whole set L?α and some subset
of L?β . Moreover, a justification logic L
? is defined by the set of axioms and its
constant specification CS that determines which constant justifies which axiom.
So the constant specification is a set
CS ⊆ {(c, A) | c is a constant and A is an axiom of L?}
In this sense L?CS denotes the logic L
? with the constant specification CS. To
deduce formulas in L?CS we use a Hilbert system given by L
? and the rules modus
ponens:
A A→ B (MP)
B
and axiom necessitation
(AN!) ∀n ∈ N, where (c, A) ∈ CS
!...!︸︷︷︸
n
: !...!︸︷︷︸
n−1
: ... : !!c : !c : c : A
2.2 Semantics
Definition 1 (L?CS-subset models) Given some logic L
? and some constant
specification CS, then an L?CS-subset model M = (W,W0, V, E) is defined by:
– W is a set of objects called worlds.
– W0 ⊆W and W0 6= ∅ .
– V : W × LJ → {0, 1} such that for all ω ∈W0, t ∈ Tm, F,G ∈ LJ :
• V (ω,⊥) = 0;
• V (ω, F → G) = 1 iff V (ω, F ) = 0 or V (ω,G) = 1;
• V (ω, t : F ) = 1 iff E(ω, t) ⊆ { υ ∈W | V (υ, F ) = 1 }.
– E : W × Tm→ P(W ) that meets the following conditions where we use
[A] := {ω ∈W | V (ω,A) = 1}. (1)
For all ω ∈W0, and for all s, t ∈ Tm:
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• E(ω, s+ t) ⊆ E(ω, s) ∩ E(ω, t);
• E(ω, c?) ⊆WMP where WMP is the set of deductively closed worlds, see
below;
• if jd ∈ L?, then ∃υ ∈W0 with υ ∈ E(ω, t);
• if jt ∈ L?, then ω ∈ E(ω, t);
• if j4 ∈ L?, then
E(ω, !t) ⊆
{ υ ∈W | ∀F ∈ LJ (V (ω, t : F ) = 1⇒ V (υ, t : F ) = 1) } ;
• for all n ∈ N and for all (c, A) ∈ CS : E(ω, c) ⊆ [A] and
E(ω, !...!︸︷︷︸
n
c) ⊆ [ !...!︸︷︷︸
n−1
c : ....!c : c : A].
The set WMP is formally defined as follows:
WMP := {ω ∈W | ∀A,B ∈ LJ ((V (ω,A) = 1 and V (ω,A→ B) = 1)
implies V (ω,B) = 1)}.
So WMP collects all the worlds where the valuation function is closed under
modus ponens. W0 is the set of normal worlds. The set W \W0 consists of the
non-normal worlds. Moreover, using the notation introduced by (1), we can read
the condition on V for justification terms t : F as:
V (ω, t : F ) = 1 iff E(ω, t) ⊆ [F ]
Since the valuation function V is defined on worlds and formulas, the defini-
tion of truth is pretty simple:
Definition 2 (Truth in L?CS-subset models) Let M = (W,W0, V, E) be an
L?CS-subset model, ω ∈W and F ∈ LJ . We define the relation  as follows:
M, ω  F iff V (ω, F ) = 1
2.3 Soundness
Since non-normal worlds will not be sound even with respect to the axioms of
classical logic, we only have soundness within W0.
Theorem 3 (Soundness of L?CS-subset models) For any justification logic
L?CS and any formula F ∈ LJ :
L?CS ` F ⇒ M, ω  F for all L?CS-subset models M and all ω ∈W0
The proof straight forward is by induction on the length on the derivation of F
and can be found in [17].
The j-axiom s : (A→ B)→ (t : A→ s · t : B) is not part of our logic. Using
the (c?)-axiom, we can define an application operation such that the j-axiom is
valid.
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Definition 4 (Application) We introduce a new abbreviation · on terms by:
s · t := s+ t+ c?
Lemma 5 (The “j-axiom” follows) For all M = (W,W0, V, E), ω ∈ W0,
A,B ∈ LJ and s, t ∈ Tm:
M, ω  s : (A→ B)→ (t : A→ s · t : B)
The proof is straight forward and can be found in appendix A.
Lemma 6 (Application is communative) LetM = (W,W0, V, E) be an L?-
subset model, ω ∈W , A ∈ LJ , s, t ∈ Tm, then:
M, ω  s · t : A↔ t · s : A
The proof is straight forward by using the commutativity of intersection. For
details see [17].
So it does not make a difference, whether we first have evidence for B → A and
then for B or vice versa. In other words, the order in which evidence is presented
does not matter.
2.4 Completeness
To prove completeness we will construct a canonical model and then show that
for every formula F that is not derivable in L?CS, there is a model MC with a
world Γ ∈ WC0 s.t. MC , Γ  ¬F . Before we start with the definition of the
canonical model, we must do some preliminary work. We will first prove that
our logics are conservative extensions of classical logic. With this result we can
argue, that the empty set is consistent and hence can be extended to so-called
maximal L?CS-consistent sets of formulas. These sets will be used to build the
W0-worlds in the canonical model.
Theorem 7 (Conservativity) All logics L? presented are conservative exten-
sions of the classical logic CL, i.e. for any formula F ∈ Lcp:
L? ` F ⇔ CL ` F
The proof is standard and can be found in [17].
Definition 8 (Consistency) A logical theory L is called consistent, if L 6`⊥.
A set of formulas Γ ⊂ LJ is called L-consistent if L 6`
∧
Σ →⊥ for every finite
Σ ⊆ Γ . A set of formulas Γ is called maximal L-consistent, if it is L-consistent
and none of its proper supersets is.
Since all presented logics are conservative extensions of CL , we have the
following consistency result.
Lemma 9 (Consistency of the logics) All presented logics are consistent.
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As usual, we have a Lindenbaum lemma and the usual properties of maximal
consistent sets hold, see, e.g., [16].
Lemma 10 (Lindenbaum Lemma) Given some logic L, then for each L- con-
sistent set of formulas Γ ⊂ LJ there exists a maximal consistent set Γ ′ such that
Γ ⊆ Γ ′.
Lemma 11 (Properties of maximal consistent sets) Given some logic L
and its language LJ . If Γ is a maximal L-consistent set, then for all F,G ∈ LJ :
(1) if L ` F , then F ∈ Γ ;
(2) F ∈ Γ if and only if ¬F 6∈ Γ ;
(3) F → G ∈ Γ if and only if F 6∈ Γ or G ∈ Γ ;
(4) F ∈ Γ and F → G ∈ Γ imply G ∈ Γ .
Definition 12 (Canonical Model) For a given logic L?CS we define the canon-
ical model MC = (WC ,WC0 , V C , EC) by:
– WC = P(LJ).
– WC0 =
{
Γ ∈WC
∣∣ Γ is maximal L?CS − consistent set of formulas }.
– V C : V C(Γ, F ) = 1 iff F ∈ Γ ;
– EC : With Γ/t := {F ∈ LJ | t : F ∈ Γ} and
WCMP :=
{
Γ ∈WC
∣∣ ∀A,B ∈ LJ : if A→ B ∈ Γ and A ∈ Γ then B ∈ Γ }
we define :
EC(Γ, t) =
{
∆ ∈WC
∣∣ ∆ ⊇ Γ/t } for t 6= c?;
EC(Γ, c?) =
{
∆ ∈WCMP
∣∣ ∆ ⊇ Γ/c? } .
Now we must show that the canonical model is indeed an L?CS-subset model.
Lemma 13 The canonical model MC is an L?CS-subset model.
The proof can be found in appendix B. The Truth Lemma follows very closely:
Lemma 14 (Truth Lemma) Let MC = (WC ,WC0 , EC , V C) be a canonical
model, then for any Γ ∈WC0 :
MC , Γ  F if and only if F ∈ Γ.
Proof.
MC , Γ  F Def. 2⇐==⇒ V C(Γ, F ) = 1 Def. 12⇐===⇒ F ∈ Γ.
Hence each maximal L?CS-consistent set is represented by some world in the
canonical model and thus completeness follows directly:
Theorem 15 (Completeness) Given some logic L?CS, then
M, Γ  F for all L?CS-subset models M and for all Γ ∈W0 =⇒ L?CS ` F.
Proof. The proof works with contraposition: Assume that L?CS 6` F . Then {¬F}
is L?CS-consistent and by the Lindenbaum Lemma contained in some maximal
L?CS-consistent world Γ of the canonical model MC . Then MC , Γ 6 F .
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3 LACS-subset models
In this part we present an alternative definition of subset models for justification
logic that directly interprets the application operator. Hence we work with the
standard language of justification logic and we consider the j-axiom instead of
the axiom (c?).
3.1 Syntax
In this section, justification terms are built from constants ci and variables xi
according to the following grammar:
t ::= ci | xi | (t · t) | (t+ t) | !t
This set of terms is denoted by TmA. The operations · and + are left-associative
and ! binds stronger than anything else. Formulas are built from atomic propo-
sitions pi and the following grammar:
F ::= pi | ⊥ | F → F | t : F
The set of atomic propositions is denoted by Prop and the set of all formulas is
denoted by LAJ . Again we use the other logical connectives as abbreviations.
As in the first section, we investigate again a whole family of logics. They
are arranged in two sets of axioms. The first set, denoted by LAα contains the
following axioms:
cl all axioms of classical propositional logic;
j s : (A→ B)→ (t : A→ s · t : B);
j+ s : A ∨ t : A→ (s+ t) : A.
The other is identical to L?β (modulo the different language) and contains:
j4 t : A→!t : (t : A);
jd t :⊥→⊥;
jt t : A→ A.
For the sake of uniformity we denote this set of axioms by LAβ . By L
A we denote
all logics that are composed from the whole set LAα and some subset of L
A
β .
There are no differences between these logics and the ones of the former
section except in case of application. Therefore we skip all the details already
mentioned and proved before.
CS and LACS are defined as before except that the corresponding logic has changed
as mentioned. And deducing formulas in LACS works the same as in the previous
section.
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3.2 Semantics
Definition 16 (LACS-subset models) Given some logic L
A
CS then an L
A
CS-subset
model M = (W,W0, V, E) is defined like an L?CS-subset model where
E : W × TmA → P(W )
meets the following condition for terms of the form s · t:
E(ω, s · t) ⊆ {υ ∈W | ∀F ∈ APPω(s, t)(υ ∈ [F ])},
where we use
APPω(s, t) := {F ∈ LAJ | ∃H ∈ LAJ s.t. E(ω, s) ⊆ [H → F ] and E(ω, t) ⊆ [H]}.
The set APPω(s, t) contains all formulas that are colloquially said derivable
by applying modus ponens to a formula justified by s and a formula justified
by t.
Truth in an LACS-subset models is defined as before.
Definition 17 (Truth in LACS-subset models) For an L
A
CS-subset modelM =
(W,W0, V, E) and a world ω ∈ W and a formula F we define the relation  as
follows:
M, ω  F iff V (ω, F ) = 1.
3.3 Soundness
Theorem 18 (Soundness of LACS-subset models) For any justification logic
LA, any constant specification CS and any formula F :
LACS ` F ⇒ M, ω  F for all LACS − subset models M and all ω ∈W0.
The proof is straight forward by induction on the length of the derivation and
can be found in [17].
3.4 Completeness
Before we start defining a canonical model, we have to do the same preliminary
work for LACS as we had to do in the previous section for L
?
CS. Since the logics L
?
CS
from the former section differ only in one axiom, i.e. j replaces jc?, we skip all
the parts that are already done and focus on the changes that it brings about.
As before, we have a conservativity and consistency result.
Theorem 19 (Conservativity) All logics LA presented are conservative ex-
tensions of the classical logic CL, i.e. for any formula F ∈ Lcp:
LA ` F ⇔ CL ` F.
Lemma 20 (Consistency of LA) All logics in LA are consistent.
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All the other ingredients we needed in the former section to define and fur-
ther develop the canonical model were generally defined and proven and can be
adopted without additional effort.
To prove completeness we define a canonical model as follows:
Definition 21 (Canonical Model) For a given logic LA and a constant spec-
ification CS we define the canonical model MC = (WC ,WC0 , V C , EC) by:
– WC = P(LAJ);
– WC0 = {Γ ∈WC | Γ is maximal LACS − consistent set of formulas};
– V C : V C(Γ, F ) = 1 iff F ∈ Γ ;
– EC : EC(Γ, t) = {∆ ∈W | ∆ ⊇ Γ/t}.
Now we must show that such a canonical model is in fact a subset model.
Lemma 22 The canonical model MC is an LACS-subset model.
The proof is very similar to the proof of Lemma 13 and can be found in appendix
C
Lemma 23 (Truth Lemma) Let MC = (WC ,WC0 , EC , V C) be some canon-
ical LACS-subset model, then for all Γ ∈W0:
MC , Γ  F if and only if F ∈ Γ.
Proof.
MC , Γ  F Def. 17⇐===⇒ V C(Γ, F ) = 1 Def. 21⇐===⇒ F ∈ Γ.
Theorem 24 (Completeness) Given some constant specification CS then
M, Γ  F for all models M and for all Γ ∈W0 =⇒ LACS ` F.
Proof. The proof is analogue to the one of Theorem 15.
4 Artemov’s aggregated evidence and L?CS-subset models
Artemov [1] considers the case in which we have a database, i.e. a set of proposi-
tions Γ = {F1, . . . Fn} with some kind of probability estimates and in which we
also have some proposition X that logically follows from Γ . Then we can search
for the best justified lower bound for the probability of X. He presents us a nice
way to find this lower bound. To find it, he assumes probability events u1, . . . , un,
each of them supporting some proposition in Γ , i.e. ui : Fi, and calculates some
aggregated evidence e(u1, . . . , un) for X with them. The probability of e then
provides a tight lower bound for the probability of X.
The trick he uses is the following:
(1) First he collects all subsets ∆i of Γ which support X, i.e. ∆i ` X, and
creates a new evidence ti from all the corresponding uij s.t. uij : Fij for each
Fij ∈ ∆i.
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(2) In the second step he combines all these new pieces of evidence to a new
evidence (the so-called aggregated evidence) that actually is the greatest
evidence supporting X.
The model he has in mind contains some evaluation in a probability space
(Ω,F , P ) with a mapping ? from propositions to Ω and evidence terms to F that
meets some restrictions (for more details on this see [1]). Step (1) is to create a
new evidence ti for each ∆i described above, which consists of the intersection
of the corresponding uij’s.
ti :=
⋂
{uij | uij ⊆ F ?ij for some Fij ∈ ∆i}.
Step (2) then is to union all these pieces of evidence to a new so-called aggregated
evidence:
AEΓ(X) :=
⋃
{ti | ti is an evidence for X obtained by step (1)}.
On the syntactic side evidence terms are built from variables u1, . . . , un,
constants 0 and 1 and operations ∩ and ∪, where st is used as an abbreviation
for s ∩ t. With this we can built a free distributive lattice Ln where st is the
meet and s∪ t is the join of s and t, 0 is the bottom and 1 the top element of this
lattice. Moreover Artemov defines formulas in a usual way from propositional
letters p, q, r, . . . by the usual connectives and adds formulas of the kind t : F
where t is an evidence term and F a purely propositional formula.
The logical postulates of the logic of Probabilistic Evidence PE are:
(1) axioms and rules of classical logic in the language of PE;
(2) s : (A→ B)→ (t : A→ [st] : B);
(3) (s : A ∧ t : A)→ [s ∪ t] : A;
(4) 1 : A, where A is a propositional tautology,
0 : F , where F is a propositional formula;
(5) t : X → s : X, for any evidence terms s and t such that s  t in Ln.
Artemov presents Soundness and Completeness proofs connecting PE with the
presented semantic, for more details see [1].
Before we can start adapting Artemovs approach to our models, we have to
point out some differences between the semantics and syntax used. First, con-
trary to the models of Artemov, subset models may contain inconsistent worlds,
but this does not significantly affect the applicability of Artemov’s approach on
them.
Another difference is that our evidence function has another domain. In Arte-
mov’s models the evidence functions is E : Tm→ P(Ω) while in our models it is
E : W × Tm→ P(W ). This difference is due to the fact that we allow terms to
justify non-purely propositional formulas. Although we need to adapt Artemov’s
definitions, these adaptations will maintain the essential characteristics. So let’s
adapt the L?CS-subset models to aggregated L
?
CS-subset models by first describing
the new syntax for the terms:
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Definition 25 (Justification Terms) Justification terms are built from con-
stants 0, 1, ci and variables xi and the special and unique constant c
? according
to the following grammar:
t ::= 0 | 1 | ci | xi | c? | (t+ t) | (t ∪ t) | !t
This set of terms is denoted by TmP. As before, we introduce the abbreviation
st := s+ t+ c?.
Even though we have other operators as well, we can construct a free distributive
lattice where we take s+ t as the meet of s and t, s∪ t as the join of them, 0 as
the bottom element of the lattice. Note, that st then is the meet of s, t, and c?.
Moreover, 1 and !t are treated like constants.1 As usual, we have
s  t iff s ∪ t = t (2)
So not all pairs of terms are comparable. But that has no consequences so
far.
There is no difference to our subset models regarding the rules for forming
formulas except that the terms are contained in TmP, of course. The set of
formulas built according to these grammar and rules is denoted by Lprob.
In the definition of L?CS-subset models we only change the conditions on the
evidence function and the domain of V .
Definition 26 (PE-adapted subset models) An L?CS- subset model is called
a PE-adapted L?CS-subset model if the valuation function and the evidence func-
tion meet the additional conditions respectively are redefined as follows:
– V : W ×Lprob → {0, 1} where all conditions listed in Definition 1 remain the
same.
– For all ω ∈W0 and for all s, t ∈ TmP:
• E(ω, 1) = W0;
• E(ω, 0) = ∅;
• E(ω, s ∪ t) = E(ω, s) ∪ E(ω, t).
And in fact, such an PE-adapted L?CS-subset model is a model of probabilistic
evidence PE.
Theorem 27 (Soundness) PE-adapted L?CS-subset models M are sound with
respect to probabilistic evidence PE, i.e. for all F ∈ Lprob
PE ` F ⇒ M, ω  F for all PE-adapted L?CS-subset models and all ω ∈W0.
The proof is by induction on the length of the derivation of F and can be found
in appendix D
1 We do not claim that 1 is the top element since some set E(ω, t) for a world ω ∈W0
and t ∈ TmP may contain non-normal worlds. If we claimed that 1 was the top
element we would obtain t  1 and furthermore the set E(ω, 1) would contain non-
normal worlds as well. But since in non-normal worlds axioms may not be true,
E(ω, 1) 6⊆ [A] for some axiom A may be the case and therefore axiom (4) would fail.
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Theorem 28 (model existence) There exists a PE-adapted L?CS-subset model.
Proof. We construct a model M = {W,W0, V, E} as follows:
– W = W0 = {ω}.
– The valuation function is built bottom up:
(1) V (ω,⊥) = 0;
(2) V (ω, P ) = 1, for all P ∈ Prop;
(3) V (ω,A→ B) = 1 iff V (ω,A) = 0 or V (ω,B) = 1;
(4) V (ω, t : F ) = 1 iff t 6≥ 1 or if t ≥ 1 and V (ω, F ) = 1.
– E(ω, t) =
{
{ω} if t ≥ 1
∅ otherwise.
It is straightforward to show that M is indeed a PE-adapted L?CS-subset
model. Let us only show the condition E(ω, s ∪ t) = E(ω, s) ∪ E(ω, t).
Suppose first s, t 6≥ 1, Then E(ω, s ∪ t) = ∅ = E(ω, s) = E(ω, t) and hence
the claim follows immediately.
Suppose at least one term of s and t is in greater than 1, then E(ω, s) = {ω}
or E(ω, t) = {ω} and hence E(ω, s) ∪ E(ω, t) = {ω} and since s ≤ s ∪ t and
t ≤ s∪ t we obtain s∪ t ≥ 1 and therefore E(ω, s∪ t) = {ω}, so the claim holds.
Note that we cannot use the canonical model to show that adapted subset
models exists since in the canonical model
E(Γ, s ∪ t) 6⊆ E(Γ, s) ∪ E(Γ, t).
However, in an adapted model we need these sets to be equal (see Definition 26)
since otherwise axioms (3) and (5) would not be sound.
5 Conclusion
We introduced a new semantics, called subset semantics, for justifications. So far,
often a symbolic approach was used to interpret justifications. In our semantics,
justifications are modeled as sets of possible worlds. We also presented a new
justification logic that is sound and complete with respect to our semantics.
Moroever, we studied a variant of subset models that corresponds to traditional
justification logic.
Subset models provide a versatile tool to work with justifications. In partic-
ular, we can naturally extend them with probability measures to capture uncer-
tain justifications. In the last part of the paper, we showed that subset models
subsume Artemov’s approach to aggregating probabilistic evidence.
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A The “j-axiom” follows (Lemma 5)
For all M = (W,W0, V, E), ω ∈W0, A,B ∈ LJ and s, t ∈ Tm:
M, ω  s : (A→ B)→ (t : A→ s · t : B)
Proof. SupposeM, ω  s : (A→ B) andM, ω  t : A. Thus E(ω, s) ⊆ [A→ B]
and E(ω, t) ⊆ [A]. We find
E(ω, s · t) = E(ω, s+ t+ c?) =
E(ω, s) ∩ E(ω, t) ∩ E(ω, c?) ⊆ [A→ B] ∩ [A] ∩ E(ω, c?).
Hence for all υ ∈ E(ω, s · t) we have V (υ,A → B) = 1 and V (υ,A) = 1 and
υ ∈ E(ω, c?) and therefore V (υ,B) = 1. Hence E(ω, s · t) ⊆ [B] and we obtain
M, ω  s · t : B.
B The canonical model MC defined in Definition 12 is
an L?CS-subset model. (Lemma 13)
Proof. In order to prove this, we have to show thatMC meets all the conditions
we made for the valuation and evidence function and the constant specification
i.e.:
(1) WC0 6= ∅.
(2) For all Γ ∈WC0 :
(a) V C(Γ,⊥) = 0;
(b) V C(Γ, F → G) = 1 iff V C(Γ, F ) = 0 or V C(Γ,G) = 1;
(c) V C(Γ, t : F ) = 1 iff E(Γ, t) ⊆ [F ].
(3) For all Γ ∈WC0 , F ∈ LJ , s, t ∈ Tm:
(a) EC(Γ, s+ t) ⊆ EC(Γ, s) ∩ EC(Γ, t);
(b) EC(Γ, c?) ⊆WCMP ;
(c) if jd in L?: ∀Γ ∈WC0 and ∀t ∈ Tm : ∃υ ∈WC0 s.t. υ ∈ EC(Γ, t);
(d) if jt in L?: ∀Γ ∈WC0 and ∀t ∈ Tm : Γ ∈ EC(Γ, t);
(e) if j4 in L?:
EC(Γ, !t) ⊆{
∆ ∈WC
∣∣ ∀F ∈ LJ(V C(Γ, t : F ) = 1⇒ V C(∆, t : F ) = 1) } ;
(f) for all (c, A) ∈ CS and for all Γ ∈WC0 : EC(Γ, c) ⊆ [A] and
E(Γ, !...!︸︷︷︸
n
c) ⊆ [ !...!︸︷︷︸
n−1
c : ....!c : c : A] for all n ∈ N.
So the proofs are here:
(1) Since the empty set is proven to be L?CS-consistent (see Lemma 9) it can
be extended by the Lindenbaum Lemma to a maximal L?CS-consistent set of
formulas Γ with Γ ∈WC0 .
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(2) Suppose Γ ∈WC0 :
(a) We claim V C(Γ,⊥) = 0: Suppose the opposite, then V C(Γ,⊥) = 1 hence
by the definition of V C follows that ⊥∈ Γ . But this is a contradiction
to the fact that Γ is consistent.
(b) From left to right: Suppose V C(Γ, F → G) = 1, then by the definition
of V C , F → G ∈ Γ . Since Γ is maximal L?CS-consistent this implies by
Lemma 11 (3) that F 6∈ Γ or G ∈ Γ . Hence again by the definition of
V C , V C(Γ, F ) = 0 or V C(Γ,G) = 1.
From right to left: Suppose V C(Γ, F ) = 0 or V C(Γ,G) = 1, then by the
definition of V C either F 6∈ Γ or G ∈ Γ . Since Γ ∈ WC0 , Γ is maximal
L?-consistent and hence in both cases by Lemma 11 (3) F → G ∈ Γ .
But this means again by the definition of V C that V (Γ, F → G) = 1.
(c) From left to right: Suppose V C(Γ, t : F ) = 1, then by Definition 12
t : F ∈ Γ . Hence with the definition of Γ/t we obtain F ∈ Γ/t. So
for each ∆ ∈ EC(Γ, t), F ∈ ∆ (again by Definition 12). Hence for these
∆ it follows by the definition of V C that V C(∆,F ) = 1 and therefore
∆ ∈ [F ]. Since this is true for all ∆ ∈ EC(Γ, t) we obtain EC(Γ, t) ⊆ [F ].
From right to left: The proof is by contraposition.
Suppose V C(Γ, t : F ) 6= 1, then by the definition of V C t : F 6∈ Γ . We
define a world ∆ by ∆ := Γ/t. Since ∆ ∈ P(LJ) we can be sure that ∆
exists, i.e. ∆ ∈W . Since t : F 6∈ Γ it follows that F 6∈ Γ/t and therefore
F 6∈ ∆. But obviously ∆ ⊇ Γ/t hence ∆ ∈ EC(Γ, t). So we conclude
EC(Γ, t) 6⊆ [F ].
It remains to show that in case of t = c?, ∆ := Γ/t ∈ WCMP since
otherwise ∆ 6∈ EC(Γ, c?). In fact this is the case. Since Γ ∈ WC0 we
obtain that Γ is a maximal L?CS-consistent set of formulas and hence,
whenever c? : A, c? : (A → B) ∈ Γ then by jc? we obtain c? : B ∈ Γ .
This means that whenever A ∈ ∆ and A → B ∈ ∆ then B ∈ ∆. Hence
∆ = Γ/c? is closed under modus ponens and therefore ∆ ∈ WCMP . So
together with the former reasoning ∆ ∈ E(Γ, c?).
(3) Suppose Γ ∈WC0 :
(a) Given some F ∈ LJ , s, t ∈ Tm: We start by an observation on the relation
between the sets Γ/(s+ t) and Γ/s for Γ ∈WC0 . If s : A ∈ Γ then since
Γ is maximal L?CS-consistent s+ t : A ∈ Γ and therefore Γ/s ⊆ Γ/(s+ t).
With the same reasoning Γ/t ⊆ Γ/(s+t). Therefore if ∆ ⊇ Γ/(s+t) then
∆ ⊇ Γ/s and ∆ ⊇ Γ/t. This means that EC(Γ, s + t) ⊆ EC(Γ, s) and
EC(Γ, s+t) ⊆ EC(Γ, t) and therefore EC(Γ, s+t) ⊆ EC(Γ, s)∩EC(Γ, t).
(b) This follows directly from the definition of EC(Γ, c?).
(c) If jd in L?, then for any Γ ∈WC0 we obtain ¬(t :⊥) ∈ Γ . Hence ⊥6∈ Γ/t.
Therefore Γ/t is L?CS-consistent and can be expanded by the Lindenbaum
Lemma to a maximal L?CS-consistent set ∆ ⊇ Γ/t with ∆ ∈ WC0 and
∆ ∈ EC(Γ, t).
(d) Assume for some F ∈ LJ , Γ ∈WC0 , t ∈ Tm that F ∈ Γ/t, i.e. t : F ∈ Γ ,
since Γ is maximal L?CS-consistent and t : F → F is an instance of the
jt-axiom, we conclude that F ∈ Γ . Since F was arbitrary we obtain
Γ ⊇ Γ/t and hence Γ ∈ EC(Γ, t).
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(e) Suppose for some ∆ ∈ EC(Γ, !t), hence ∆ ⊇ Γ/!t. Then assume for some
arbitrary F ∈ LJ , V (Γ, t : F ) = 1 i.e. by Definition 12 t : F ∈ Γ . Since
Γ is maximal L?CS-consistent and t : F →!t : (t : F ) is an instance of the
j4-axiom we obtain !t : (t : F ) ∈ Γ and hence t : F ∈ Γ/!t. But then
t : F ∈ ∆ and by Definition 12 it follows that V C(∆, t : F ) = 1. Since
F was an arbitrary formula and ∆ an arbitrary world of EC(Γ, !t) we
conclude that the condition holds.
(f) Suppose (c, A) ∈ CS, maximal L?CS-consistency implies for all Γ ∈ WC0
that c : A ∈ Γ . Hence A ∈ Γ/c and for all ∆ ∈ EC(Γ, c) we obtain
A ∈ ∆ and therefore EC(Γ, c) ⊆ [A].
Furthermore maximal L?CS-consistency implies for all Γ ∈ W0 by axiom
necessitation that
!...!︸︷︷︸
n
c : ... :!c : c : A ∈ Γ
. Hence
!...!︸︷︷︸
n−1
c : ... :!c : c : A ∈ Γ/ !...!︸︷︷︸
n
c
and for all ∆ ∈ EC(Γ, !...!︸︷︷︸
n
c) we obtain
!...!︸︷︷︸
n−1
c : ... :!c : c : A ∈ ∆
and therefore
EC(Γ, !...!︸︷︷︸
n
c) ⊆ [ !...!︸︷︷︸
n−1
c : ... :!c : c : A]
.
C The canonical model defined in Definition 21 is an
LACS-subset model (Lemma 22)
Proof. In order to prove that, we have to proceed in the same way as in the
previous section, i.e. showing thatMC meets all the conditions we made for the
valuation and the evidence function as well as the constant specification.
Since the canonical model is defined in the same way as the one of L?CS-subset
models, the corresponding proofs can be reused (see Lemma 13). Nevertheless,
there is some difference. Instead of showing that EC(Γ, c?) ⊆ WCMP we have
to show that EC(Γ, s · t) ⊆ {∆ ∈ WC | ∀F ∈ APPΓ (s, t)(∆ ∈ [F ])}. Assume
that we are given Γ ∈ WC0 , F ∈ LAJ , s, t ∈ Tm
A. Take any ∆ ∈ EC(Γ, s · t),
i.e. ∆ ⊇ Γ/(s · t). Hence for all F s.t. s · t : F ∈ Γ we know that F ∈ ∆. Hence
by the definition of V C , we have V (∆,F ) = 1 and therefore ∆ ∈ [F ].
It remains to show: if F ∈ APPΓ (s, t) then s · t : F ∈ Γ . Suppose for
some formula F that F ∈ APPΓ (s, t) then by definition of APPΓ (s, t) we know
that there is a formula H s.t. EC(Γ, s) ⊆ [H → F ] and EC(Γ, t) ⊆ [H]. By
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using Lemma 22 (the part that corresponds to Lemma 13 (2c)) we conclude
V C(Γ, s : (H → F )) = 1 and V C(Γ, t : H) = 1. Hence by the definition of V C
we obtain s : (H → F ) ∈ Γ and t : H ∈ Γ and since Γ is maximal LACS-consistent
and s : (H → F )→ (t : H → s · t : F ) is an instance of the j-axiom we conclude
that s · t : F ∈ Γ .
D Soundness of PE-addapted L?-subset models
(Theorem 27)
PE-adapted L?CS-subset models M are sound with respect to probabilistic evi-
dence PE, i.e. for all F ∈ Lprob
PE ` F ⇒ M, ω  F for all PE-adapted L?CS-subset models and all ω ∈W0.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the length of the derivation of F :
– If F is derived by axiom necessitation or modus ponens or is an instance of
axiom (1), then the proof is the analogue as in Theorem 3 since the relevant
definitions have remained the same.
– If F is an instance of axiom (2) the proof is analogue to the proof of Lemma 5:
SupposeM, ω  s : (A→ B) andM, ω  t : A then E(ω, s) ⊆ [A→ B] and
E(ω, t) ⊆ [A].
E(ω, st) = E(ω, s+ t+ c?) ⊆
E(ω, s) ∩ E(ω, t) ∩ E(ω, c?) ⊆ [A→ B] ∩ [A] ∩ E(ω, c?).
Hence for all υ ∈ E(ω, st) we have V (υ,A → B) = 1 and V (υ,A) = 1 and
υ ∈ E(ω, c?) and therefore V (υ,B) = 1. Hence E(ω, st) ⊆ [B] and we obtain
M, ω  st : B.
– If F is an instance of axiom (3) then F = (s : A ∧ t : A) → [s ∪ t : A] for
some A ∈ Lprob, s, t ∈ TmP. SupposeM, ω  s : A∧ t : A hence E(ω, s) ⊆ [A]
and E(ω, t) ⊆ [A]. Therefore E(ω, s ∪ t) ⊆ E(ω, s) ∪E(ω, t) ⊆ [A] and since
ω ∈W0 we obtain M, ω  s ∪ t : A.
– If F is an instance of axiom (4) then either F = 1 : A for some axiom A or
0 : G for some formula G.
Suppose F = 1 : A for some axiom A. We assume that M, ω  A for all
ω ∈ W0, hence E(ω, 1) = W0 ⊆ [A] and therefore M, ω  1 : A for all
ω ∈W0.
Suppose F = 0 : G: For any ω ∈ W0 we have E(ω, 0) = ∅ by Definition 26.
Since ∅ is a subset of any subset of W , we obtain E(ω, 0) = ∅ ⊆ [G] for any
formula G ∈ Lprob.
– F is an instance of axiom (5). Assume M, ω  t : X for some term t and
some formula X and let s  t. By (2) we find t = s ∪ t. Thus
E(ω, t) = E(ω, s ∪ t) = E(ω, s) ∪ E(ω, t)
and therefore E(ω, s) ⊆ E(ω, t). The assumption M, ω  t : X means that
E(ω, t) ⊆ [X]. Hence we also get E(ω, s) ⊆ [X] and conclude M, ω  s : X.
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